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Abstract
In human society, a lot of social phenomena can be concluded into a math-
ematical problem called the bipartite matching, one of the most well known
model is the marriage problem proposed by Gale and Shapley. In this arti-
cle, we try to find out some intrinsic properties of the ground state of this
model and thus gain more insights and ideas about the matching problem.
We apply Kuhn-Munkres Algorithm to find out the numerical ground state
solution of the system. The simulation result proves the previous theoretical
analysis using replica method. In the result, we also find out the amount
of blocking pairs which can be regarded as a representative of the system
stability. Furthermore, we discover that the connectivity in the bipartite
matching problem has a great impact on the stability of the ground state,
and the system will become more unstable if there were more connections
between men and women.
Keywords: bipartite matching, marriage problem, optimization, blocking
pair, K-M algorithm
1. Introduction
Bipartite matching problem, which is to match disjoint two groups of
agents, is widely seen in human society, for instance, the marriage prob-
lem between men and women, college admission problem between students
and universities, assignment between workers and jobs, and also the choice
making between buyers and sellers.
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Gale and Shapley first introduced the stable marriage problem, a one-to-
one two side matching [1], which is still one of the most important bipartite
matching problems. Gale-Shapley Algorithm guarantees the existence of a
stable solution that is also the optimal stable solution for the active side. Due
to its multiple applications in society and its intriguing fascinating proper-
ties, not only economists but also the statistic physicists are attracted by
the bipartite matching problem. By giving up the restriction to stabilize the
system, Parisi and his colleagues used the replica method of spin glass theory
to study the global optimal solution of one-to-one two side matching prob-
lem [2, 3]. Later, Zhang et al. studied the scaling behavior of Gale-Shapley
model, partial information matching and analyzed the common features of
all the stable solutions [4–6]. Moreover, Dzierzawa introduced the acceptance
threshold and thus improved the matching result of the passive side [7]. Re-
cently, Zhou et al studied the bidirectional selection problem, provided us a
new approach from human society network [9, 10].
This article is organized in the following way. First we introduce some
fundamental background about Gale-Shapley model. Then we use numerical
simulations to study the optimal solution based on the bipartite marriage
problem. By bringing the Kuhn-Munkres Algorithm [11, 12] into the mar-
riage problem, we capture the ground state of the system. Next we analyze
the average energy and other properties of this solution in detail. After that,
the number of blocking pairs in the ground state proposed by Zhang [4] is
given by the simulation result, the dynamics is also discussed here. At last,
we make a simple a quantity analysis of the stability of system ground state.
2. Model
Here we study the optimization solution of the bipartite matching prob-
lem on the basis of the Gale and Shapley marriage model. This model con-
sists of two sets of agent, M = {m1, m2, . . . , mn} standing for n men and
W = {w1, w2, . . . , wn} for n women. A final outcome of the marriage prob-
lem is a one-to-one matching of men and women, i.e. an invertible bijection
x : M → W . An outcome x can be denoted as:
x = [(m1, x(m1)), (m2, x(m2)), . . . , (mn, x(mn))],
which x(mi) = wα means the woman who matched with man mi, and
x−1(wα) = mi is the man matched with wα [13].
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One of the most attractive questions all along these years is the optimal
solution of the system. In order to find out the optimal solution, we need a
measurement for the satisfaction of each man and woman. Compared with
the way of nature that it always looks for the ground state, we also assign an
energy term εi to agent i, to represent how satisfactory he/she is. The energy
term actually represents the ranking of the assigned mate for agent i. The
smaller ε, the happier he/she is. Several previous works [2–7] postulated the
energy term ε follows a discrete uniform distribution like ε = 1, 2, . . . , n in
their model, but we think this might be extended to some other distributions.
Since we have a large population 2n in the system, there would be no much
difference between the expectation values of discrete distribution and the
continuous distribution. So here we suggest a more soften assumption that
the energy ε is randomly uniform distributed on [0, 1], and we predict that
it will not change the result much from the previous work [2–4]. With the
description of satisfaction of each agent, the optimal solution problem will
be rephrased into a minimum energy problem.
For the convenience, we denote the men with Latin alphabet, and women
with Greek alphabet. We define matrix M and W , in which Mi,α is the
energy of man mi if women wα was matched to him, all the same, Wβ,j
is the energy of woman wβ if man mj was matched to her. For a given
assignment x = [(m1, x(m1)), (m2, x(m2)), . . . , (mn, x(mn))], we can calculate
the average energy of each man and woman:
εM(x) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Mi,x(mi), (1)
εW (x) =
1
n
n∑
α=1
Wα,x−1(wα) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Wx(mi),i. (2)
Then we have the average energy per person:
εH(x) =
1
2n
[
n∑
i=1
Mi,x(mi) +
n∑
i=1
Wx(mi),i] =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Hi,x(mi). (3)
Here we define the matrix H = M+W
T
2
, where the element Hi,α is the mean
energy of the manmi and woman wα. With the matrix H , we now are able to
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solve the optimal solution εminH i.e. the minimum of εH, and the corresponding
matching x is called the ground state.
In the example of a matching problem which consists nmen and n women,
there will be n! different states of the system in total. Obviously it’s neither
possible nor clever to find out the ground state by Exhaustive method. Facing
with a similar situation, Kuhn [11] and Munkres [12] developed an algorithm
called Kuhn−Munkres algorithm, to solve minimum solution in a weighted
bipartite matching. We think this method can also be applied to our problem
here. The total energy matrix H can be regarded as the cost matrix in
the bipartite assignment problem. In this way, it is possible to dig out the
matching corresponding to the ground state which has the lowest global
energy only spending time of O(n4). But with previous study of the matching
problem, it’s unfortunate that the ground state of this matching problem is
not stationary state, which means it is not stable. Here we call a matching x
is stable only if there was no pairs of man and woman who prefer each other
than their assigned mate in x, that is to say, for each individual there is no
any better choice to improve their personal situation. But if such pair of man
mi and woman wα exists, we name it a blocking pair [4, 14], abbreviated as
BP hereafter. The more BPs a system contains, the more unstable it is.
We are curious about the quantity of BPs in a matching problem, because it
can be treated as a representative for the stability of a certain matching [4].
3. K-M Algorithm
Before we give a description of this algorithm [11, 12], we’d like to intro-
duce two lemmas:
Lemma 1. The equivalent statement of Ko¨nig’s theorem: in matrix H ,
the biggest amount of independent zero elements we can find is equal to the
minimum number of lines (rows or columns) that covers all the zero elements.
Lemma 2. Obviously, the minimal assignment solution does not change,
if we add or subtract the same number in any rows or columns at the same
time.
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Algorithm description
Step 1. Starting with a given matrix H , for each row and column,
we subtract its minimum value from the rows and columns (thus we
create one or several zeros in those rows and columns). We denote the
new matrix H1.
Step 2. Find the smallest set of lines Lk(vertical and horizontal),
which consists of nk lines, to cover all the zeros in the matrix H1.
Step 3. If nk = n, then we will have n independent zeros, the corre-
sponding n positions represent the final assignment.
Step 4. If nk < n, find out the smallest matrix element ak which was
not covered by any of Lk. We add ak to all the uncovered rows and
subtract ak from all the uncovered columns. Then return to step 2.
4. Simulation and Analysis
We applied this Kuhn-Munkres Algorithm to our model, and studied
the optimal solution i.e.ground state of the marriage problem where the
population of men or women n = 100, 200, 300, . . . , 1000.
With each fixed population of n men and n women, we did 100 trials
starting with randomly generated H matrix, the result of the average energy
per person in the ground state 〈εminH 〉 and its standard deviation σ are shown
in Tab.1. We see that the standard deviation can be estimited as the recip-
rocal of n. That is because each agent is identical to another who are weakly
correlated, by the Central Limit Theorem [15], we can know the εminH follows
the normal distribution. Furthermore, we make 10000 trials when n=100,
the simulation result proves our analysis, shown in Fig.1.
Table 1: Mean and Standard Deviation of Energy Per Person
n 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900
〈εmin
H
〉 0.0802 0.0569 0.0464 0.0405 0.0361 0.0329 0.0305 0.0285 0.0269
σ 0.0034 0.0017 0.0011 0.00091 0.00070 0.00056 0.00047 0.00042 0.00038
The 〈εminH 〉 for the 100 trials is shown in Fig.2. With a power exponent
fit, we get the power of −0.495 and also the expectation of average energy
per person is 0.808√
n
, which is very close to the predicted value 0.8085√
n
of Zhang
et al [4] with replica method.
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Figure 1: The distribution of 10000 trials on εminH when n = 100.
Furthermore, the distribution of personal energy ε is studied here as well,
shown in Fig.2. By taking the semi-logarithmic, we find that the probability
distribution function f(ε) decays faster than exponent, but it can be fitted
almost perfectly by an exponent function with its index being quadratic
function:
f(ε)√
n
= e−a(
√
nε)2−b(√nε)+c. (4)
If we treat the
√
nε as the argument and the f(ε)√
n
as the dependent variable
(in this way we normalized the scaling factor), and then fit the parameter a,
b and c in Eq. (4) with the simulation results, we get a = 0.19, b = 0.68, and
c = 0.02, so the distribution function can be written as:
f(ε)√
n
= e−0.19(
√
nε)2−0.68(√nε)+0.02. (5)
To ensure that these parameters are reasonable, we integrate the distribution
function and it shows that:
∫ 1
0
f(ε) dε = 1.03, (6)
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Figure 2: The relationship between 〈εminH 〉 and the system scale n, for n =
100, 200, 300, . . . , 1000. The dashed line indicate the fitting of 0.808√
n
.
∫ 1
0
εf(ε) dε =
0.84√
n
. (7)
The result is a little bigger than the actual value, which means the actual
distribution function decays even faster than e−ε
2
, but this function is still
in good accordance with the simulation result.
5. Blocking Pairs
As Zhang et al mentioned [4], the quantity of blocking pairs can be used as
a measurement of the stability of a solution, and he gave a rough estimation
of the number of blocking pairs being (nε)2 ∼ 0.65n .
Now we try to think more about this. First let us consider the pos-
sibility that a man cannot find a BP . Imagine a man i with energy ε,
there would be nε women who are possible to form a BP with man i,
i.e.Fi,α1, Fi,α2 , . . . , Fi,αnε < Fi,x(i). If these nε women satisfied the follow-
ing situation that their current mate were all better than man i, which can
be represented as:
Gα1,x−1(α1) < Gα1,i, Gα2,x−1(α2) < Gα2,i, . . . , Gαnε,x−1(αnε) < Gαnε,i,
there would not be any blocking pair forming with man i.
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Figure 3: (Color online) The PDF of ε with n = 100(black circles), 300(red circles),
1000(blue circles). The dashed lines are the corresponding fitting by Eq. (5).
In the process of chasing ground state, if we neglect other influencing
factors and fix the Gα,i, we can see that the possibility of woman α matching
to man i gets bigger when Fi,α gets smaller. So in the situation that woman
α was not matched to man i even if Fi,α was very small, it’s reasonable to say
that the expected energy of men i is bigger than average. Then the possibility
of woman α and man i being a BP is smaller than Gα,x−1(α). Therefore, the
possibility P0(ε) that man i with energy ε cannot find a blocking pair:
P0(ε) >
nε∏
i=1
(1−Gαi,x−1(αi))
≈ e−
∑nε
i=1Gαi,x−1(αi)
≈ e−0.808
√
nε.
(8)
Hence, the possibility P0 that a man couldn’t find a woman to build up a
BP can be estimated:
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Figure 4: The fitting of f(ε)√
n
against
√
nε.
P0 =
∫ 1
0
f(ε)P0(ε) dε
≈
∫ 1
0
f(ε)e−0.808
√
nε dε
>
∫ 1
0
f(ε)(1− 0.808√nε) dε
= 1− 0.8082 = 0.35,
(9)
which happens to be same with Zhang et al [4]. Furthermore, if we substi-
tute Eq. (5) into Eq. (9),
P0 =
∫ 1
0
e−0.19(
√
nε)2−0.68(√nε)+0.02e−0.808
√
n dε
≈
∫ ∞
0
e−0.19ε
2−1.488ε+0.02 dε
= 0.60.
(10)
The result from numerical simulation is P0 = 0.758.
It is shown in the numerical simulation that in a system consists of n men
and n women, in which there are 0.758n men who has no potential mate to
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Figure 5: (a)The amount of BPs NBP (red squares) and (b)the number of men who
form BPs Nbp (blue squares) versus the system scale n in the simulation result. The
corresponding dashed lines are the linear fits of the data, slop shown in the figure.
build up a BP , and 0.242n men who have one or more women forming BPs
with them. In total, there are 0.325n BPs in the system(Fig.5).
we can think over the probability that more than one woman who form
BPs with man i: mi has a possibility of 75.8% to find no one to form a BP
with him, possibility of 24.2% to have one or more women to build up BPs.
In the 24.2% of men who is one side of the BPs, if mi and wα forms a BP ,
the other n− 1 women besides wα will have a possibility of 75.8% that could
not form a BP with man. That is to say, the possibility that there is one
and only one woman who builds up a BP with man is 0.242 × 0.758; the
possibility that there are two or more women who form BPs with man is
0.242× 0.242. Among these women, there would be 0.758× 0.2422 n women
who forms two BPs. And so on we can see the possibility that a man could
find exact k women to form k BPs is that:
Pk = 0.758× (1− 0.758)k, k = 0, 1, 2, . . . . (11)
Our simulation result is shown in Fig.6. To further ensure with Eq. (11), we
calculate the total number of BPs:
NB.P. =
∞∑
k=1
0.758× 0.242k × k × n = 0.319n, (12)
which is in good consistency with former numerical simulation. To each man,
averagely, there would be 0.325 woman who can form a BP with him.
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Figure 6: The probability of k the number of BPs one has in the systems consist of
100(blue triangles), 300(purple circles), and 1000(green inverted triangles) men or women.
The red line is the theoretical prediction by previous analysis.
In order to get a clearer view of the fore mentioned stability issue, here we
introduce a parameter which is crucial to the stability of system. Imagine a
man i who only acquaint only some of the women, for example, a tiny fraction
k(0 < k ≪ 1). In this case, this man i is satisfied only if he couldn’t find a
BP partner. The possibility which he is satisfied can be roughly estimated
as:
Ps = (1− 0.325
n
)kn ≈ 1− 0.325k → 1. (13)
So the possibility of the whole system being stable is that:
P ns ≈
1
e
0.325nk
≈ 0.72K , (14)
where K = nk is the average number of women this man acquainted.
Here we can see, this parameter k is somehow the key to the stability. As
mentioned before [6], if everybody obeyed the allocation of the matchmaker
who controls the whole system, this ground state would be the perfect choice
only considering about the global circumstances. But in fact, there are some
people of them who do not fully focus on the bigger picture (which is very
common), then it would be quite possible that someone would like to choose
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their blocking pair partner rather than the assigned one, should be. If so,
Considering in the situation that there was no extra constrains like religion,
moral standards and cultural influences, the ground state matching would be
broken with several consecutive actions of the pursuit of personal happiness.
Generally speaking, as we can see from Eq. (14), if the marriage society is
better connected, which means the people will have more relationships with
heterosexual agents, we can tell that it’s even harder for the system to get
stable. [8]
Is there any way leading us to a stable state of the matching problem?
Yes. Roth et al [14] proved the existence of such a path. They proved that
even from arbitrary state, if we keep diminishing the BPs, we will never
be trapped in a loop, and so we can always find a path to the stable state
anyway. But they didn’t give out the practical method to find such a path,
it’s very interesting to study how we can get stable state from the ground
state with this method.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we studied numerical simulation result of the ground state
of Gale-Shapley model with K-M algorithm. With a relaxation on the restric-
tions of initial assigned energy distribution, the simulation result confirmed
the theoretical analysis of the ground state using replica method. The un-
solved question about how many blocking pairs are there in the system was
also shown in the simulations. Furthermore, we discussed the factors which
affects the stability of the system, and found out that the connectivity of the
system is crucial to the stability of the ground state.
In the future, the detailed route path from the erratic ground state, to a
certain stable state would be of great interests for us to finish. What is the
micro dynamics of the system when these hopping agents tried to improve
their own situation and disregarded the cost this bring to the whole system?
After that, it is also thought-provoking to consider the reality meaning of
the ground state and the optimal stable solution. May these understanding
could better ourselves.
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